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Single Idea 15159
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
]
Full Idea
Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper.
Gist of Idea
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25
Book Ref
Soames,Scott: 'Philosophy of Language' [Princeton 2010], p.29
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[names do no more than pick out an object]:
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13789
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Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing
[Plato]
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4944
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Mill says names have denotation but not connotation
[Mill, by Kripke]
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7762
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Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object
[Mill, by Lycan]
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4978
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The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
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6410
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The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
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15159
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The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
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10449
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Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
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10823
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A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
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7089
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A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
[Wittgenstein]
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21879
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Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word
[Derrida]
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9171
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The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
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8957
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Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
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10428
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Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
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4959
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A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
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16982
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A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
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9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
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16405
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To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
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10456
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Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
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7306
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If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
[Miller,A]
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21653
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Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
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18945
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Millians say a name just means its object
[Sawyer]
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